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The aim of this note is to study the optimal licensing of a non drastic cost reducing patented
innovation, if the patent holder facing spillover is not only concerned with the optimal
number of licenses, but also with their time distrbution. A simple three agents model, a
patentee and two adopting firms, elucidates the conditions under which the patent holder
prefers exclusive innovation exploitation, giving rise to a monopoly, non exclusive
exploitation giving rise to a duopoly of simultaneous adoption or a mix of exclusive
exploitation in the first period and non exclusive one in the second period, giving rise to a
diffusion process. The results show that for very small cost reductions the patent holder
prefers early simultaneous adoption, whereas diffusion, implying asymmetric adoption, is
better if the innovation implies a more substantial cost reduction, coupled with a sufficient
spillover. Exclusive license is limited to a consistent innovation with very little spillover.
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1 Introduction 
Aoki and Tauman (2001) recently dealt with the optimal licensing of a cost reducing patented 
innovation when there is spillover: in particular the case of an outside patent-holder concerned with 
the optimal number of licenses sold by auction.
1 They found that if the innovation is relatively 
significant  the patentee sells more licenses, as compared with the case of no spillover and 
consumers are better off. 
The aim of this note is to consider what happens if the patent-holder facing spillover is not only 
concerned with the optimal number of licenses, but also with their time distribution, shaping the 
diffusion process. The spread of licenses becomes relevant if spillover is not assumed 
instantaneous, as in the Aoki and Tauman model, but the reduction in non licensees’ costs takes a 
positive time lag to take place. Such assumption seems reasonable because spillover, which might 
be unintentional, as positive externalities take place, or intentional, consequent to a weak patent 
breadth, is likely to be a time-intensive process based on learning. 
The patentee strategy is modelled as a first price auction where a predetermined number of licenses, 
endowed with different degree of exclusivity, are sold. A very simple three-stage model is 
employed with three players: a patent-holder and two potential licensees. In the first stage the 
patentee having a non drastic cost reducing innovation decides which licenses to auction in order to 
maximise  licensing profits: the alternatives are to sell one exclusive license for two periods, giving 
rise to a monopoly, two non exclusive licenses for two periods, giving rise to a duopoly of early 
simultaneous adoption or auctioning an exclusive license for period one and two licenses for period 
two, implying asymmetric adoption, indicated as diffusion. In the second stage, the two firms 
decide independently and simultaneously how much to bid for a license; in the third stage each 
firm, licensed or unlicensed, determines its profit maximising level of output. 
The results show that for very small cost reductions the patent-holder prefers early 
simultaneous adoption, whereas asymmetric adoption is better if the innovation implies a more 
substantial cost reduction, coupled with a sufficient spillover. Exclusive license is limited to a 
consistent innovation with very little spillover.  
While the focus is on the role actively played by the patentee in shaping the adoption process 
through the choice of licenses, the results are consistent with those obtained in the adoption models 
allowing for preemption, which are exclusively  demand based.
2  
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2 The game 
The foregoing discussion suggests a simple game with three agents: two identical adopting 
firms and a patent-holder offering a cost reducing process innovation. 
The two firms produce the same good  with a linear cost function  () cq q c = where  qis the 
quantity produced by a firm, and c > 0  is the constant marginal cost of production. The inverse 
demand function for this good is given by  Q a P − = , where  c a >  and Q is the aggregate quantity. 
The third player is an inventor who has got a patent for a non drastic process innovation, 
reducing the cost of production from c to  ε − c , with  0 > > − ε c a .
3 The patentee seeks to maximise 
profit by licensing the invention rather than using it to compete with the existing firms, in other 
words I am dealing with an outsider. The patentee objective is not only to decide the number of 
licenses, but their distribution in time, where the periods are 1 and 2.  The two firms seek to 
maximise their profits less licensing costs, choosing the adoption dates, either period 1 or 2.  The 
adopting firm experiences  a reduction of costs from c to  ε − c , whereas the non adopting firm 
experiences a reduction of cost from c to  µ − c  one period later, where  ε µ <  represents spillover 
effects, which might be originated by workers moving across firms or by a weak patent breadth. 
The game is noncooperative and consists of three stages. 
In the first stage the patentee decides in a first price sealed bid auction the best strategy  in order 
to maximise the licensing profits: the alternatives are to auction: 
a.  one exclusive license for two periods, giving rise to a monopoly; 
b.  two non exclusive licenses for two periods, giving rise to  a  duopoly  of                   
simultaneous adoption; 
c.  one exclusive license for period one and two licenses for period two, implying asymmetric 
adoption, denominated as diffusion.  
In the second stage, the two firms decide independently and simultaneously how much to 
bid for a license. In the third stage each firm, licensed or unlicensed, determines its profit 
maximising level of output. 
The relevant solution concept is subgame perfection in pure strategies. As it is customary in 
such case, we work backwards from the last  stage of the game to the first. 
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Stage 3 
In the last stage of the game  the two firms determine the profit maximising level of output. 
Three are the possible outcomes they may face: monopoly, duopoly and time-intensive asymmetric 
adoption with monopoly in the first period and duopoly in the second, diffusion. 
(a) Monopoly in both periods. 
If a firm adopts the innovation in period 1 and the rival firm doesn’t adopt the innovation, 
either in period 1 or in period 2, the adopting firm’s  profit, 
1
0 Π , and the non adopting firm’s , 
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,   (1) 
 
where  r  is the discount factor and  0 > − = c a s . 
The superscript indicates if the firm has adopted the innovation, the subscript if the rival has 
adopted. 1 meand adoption in perod 1, 2 in period 2, 0 no adoption, neither in period 1 or 2. 
(b)  Duopoly in both periods. 
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(c) Diffusion: monopoly in period 1 and duopoly in period 2.  
If a firm adopts in period 1 and the rival in period 2, profits are respectively 
1
2 Π  for the firm 
adopting first  and 
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.   (3) 
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Stage 2 
Knowing the third stage Cournot equilibrium profits in the different cases, we can proceed to 
the analysis of the second stage. Here the two firms independently and simultaneously decide on 
how much to bid for a license. Each firm takes the other firm’s bid as given in deciding its own. The 
difference between a licensee’s and non licensee’s in the two periods defines the most a firm will 
pay for a license. The different options are. 
a.  One  exclusive license leading to monopoly. 
We first consider the case where the patentee auctions one license with the guarantee that 
the buyer can exclusively exploit the innovation for the two periods. The license is sold to the 
highest bidder at its bid price and  in the event of a tie the patentee chooses arbitrarily the 
licensee. The succeeding firm will get a profit equal to 
1
0 Π  and  the other will get 
0
1 Π . Then the 




0 Π − Π  and, as the bid is the same, the patentee 





0 Π − Π =
I Y .                       (4) 
 
b.  Two non exclusive licenses leading to duopoly. 
If the patentee decides to sell two non exclusive licenses for the two periods, a minimum 
bid will be set such that any  firm offering a bid not inferior to the one designed by the patentee, 
gets a license. In such case, each firm’s profits will be  
1
1 Π . If one of the firms makes an offer 
smaller than that set by the patentee, its profit will be 
0
1 Π , and the rival’s 
1
0 Π . Then each firm 




1  Π − Π . As a result 






1 2   2 Π − Π =
II Y .        ( 5 )  
 
c.  One  exclusive license for period 1 and two  non exclusive licenses for period 2. 
In the third case the patentee auctions one  license for the two periods and one license only for 
period 2: in other words exclusive exploitation is guaranteed for period 1, but not for period 2. 




2  Π − Π , and   5




1  Π − Π . The result is that both firms are 








2 2   Π − Π + Π =
III Y .       ( 6 )  
 
Stage 1 
In the first stage of the game the patentee’s objective is to choose the licensing strategy which 
maximises licensing profits. The possible outcomes are: (a) exclusive license, giving rise to a 
monopoly; (b) non exclusive licenses  giving rise to a duopoly of simultaneous adoption; (c) a mix 
of exclusive license in the first period and non exclusive one in the second period, giving  rise to a 
diffusion process. 
 
3 The patentee’s choice 
We are now in the position to write the following propositions. 
 
Proposition 1 Early simultaneous adoption. If  s ) 3 / 2 ( < ε  the patent-holder will sell the license 
to both firms at period 1.  
 
Proof   
The patentee prefers simultaneous early adoption as compared to a diffusion process or to an 
exclusive license if: 
0 3 2 > − ⇒ > ε s Y Y
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Some algebra involving Eqs. (1)-(6) yields 
 
III II Y Y s > ⇒ <
3
2
ε ,       ( 7 )  













ε .    (8) 
 
As  µ ε > , if  condition 
III II Y Y >  is fulfilled, condition 
I II Y Y >  will be fulfilled as well. The 
discount factor r doesn’t play a role in proposition 1 as it doesn’t appear in condition (7), whereas 
condition (8) is fulfilled independently on it. 
 
Proposition 2 Asymmetric adoption process (diffusion). If s s ) 3 / 2 ( > >ε  and  5 / ) 2 3 ( s − > ε µ , 




If  s ) 3 / 2 ( > ε , the patent-holder prefers to promote an asymmetric  time-intensive adoption 
process rather than to sell the license to both firms in period 1, that is  s ) 3 / 2 ( > ε  implies  
II III Y Y >  
(see condition (7)). We have to check that the option to create an adopting  monopoly is not the 
preferred issue, that is  ) 5 8 2 ( 3 2 µ ε
ε
µ
ε + − > − ⇒ > s s Y Y
I III . 
Some algebra shows that: 
 







µ .         ( 9 )      




so that only second period profits are compared. 
Figure 1 shows the different cases according to the values of the parameters ε  and µ .  
In the blank area  ε µ > , which is ruled out by assumption. Simultaneous adoption (SA), 
leading to a duopoly,  requires  s ) 3 / 2 ( < ε . Asymmetric adoption leading to time-intensive diffusion 
(D)  requires  s s ) 3 / 2 ( > >ε  and  5 / ) 2 3 ( s − > ε µ , which leaves an area of incomplete adoption 
−only one of the two firm adopts− giving rise to a monopoly (M), where  s s ) 3 / 2 ( > >ε  but   7
5 / ) 2 3 ( s − < ε µ . If  0 = µ  (no spillover) diffusion is not a solution any longer and only 





















The results are somehow in line with those obtained in the adoption models allowing for pre-
emption (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985), as they  show that for very small cost reductions the patent-
holder prefers simultaneous adoption, whereas asymmetric adoption is better if the innovation 
implies a more consistent cost reduction, coupled with a sufficient spillover. Exclusive license is 
limited to a consistent innovation with very little spillover. 
The fact that patent-holder strategies include not only the number but the time distribution of 
licenses means that innovations which would have given rise to exclusive licenses, leading to 
adoption  mononopolies,  are now sold to both adopters, though through a time intensive adoption 
process. The crucial role played by spillover in enabling diffusion  is a well known argument in 
favor of thin patents.  
µ   
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1  The findings show that for an outsider patent-holder the best licensing choice is represented by auctions, 
followed by fixed fees, whereas royalties are the worst option. (Gallini and Winter 1985, Katz and Shapiro 1985, 
Kamien and Tauman 1986, Kamien, 1992 for a comprehensive survey). When the patent-holder is an incumbent, 
though,  royalty licensing is superior to the other two options. Wang (1998), Kamien and Tauman (2002). Sen and 
Tauman (2002) examine general mixed licensing schemes. 
 
2 The theoretical models of technological diffusion can be classified according to the factor which provides the 
particular focus of the analysis: the role of strategic behaviour, the uncertainty inborn in the innovation itself, the 
possibility of increasing returns. For a comprehensive survey see Hoppe (2001).  
We are here referring to the first family of models, which investigate the optimal adoption dates of n firms which are 
to decide when to buy a cost reducing innovation available on the market, based on strategic interaction among 
competing firms.  
In her seminal contributions, Reinganum (1981a, 1981b) shows that n! asymmetrical Nash equilibria define the 
optimal adoption dates of ex ante identical firms in a precommitment model. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) study the 
effects of preemption, when  firms can observe and respond to their rivals’ actions, obtaining the result that in a feed-
back duopoly equilibrium the rents of the leader and  the follower are equalised, with both asymmetric and symmetric 
adoption dates, according to preemption gains. See  Reinganum, (1989), Beath and al., (1995), Karshenas and Stoneman 
(1995) and Hoppe (2001) for comprehensive surveys. 
 
 
3 The outcome in the case of a drastic innovations always implies monopolistic exploitation. 
 